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 The year 2010 ushered in a new era in American health care.  The Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (the Affordable Care Act or the Act)1 has  
 
                                                                                                                           
∗ Professor, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center.  Many thanks 
to Christopher Brown for excellent research assistance, to Maria Albanese for valuable 
contributions in the home stretch, and to numerous members of the Shepard Broad Law Center 
“scholarship support group” for great advice. 
This Article is dedicated to the memory of Professor Bruce Winick, friend and 
mentor, because the demonstration program it analyzes is an example of therapeutic 
jurisprudence.  Should Congress approve Medicare payment for concurrent care as a result of 
that demonstration program, it would have asked and answered the question of “what legal 
principles are most beneficial to patient welfare and consistent with the actual experience of 
being sick,” then enacted the corresponding reform in the area of hospice care.  Mark A. Hall, 
Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 466 (2002).  See also Kathy L. Cerminara, 
Pandora’s Dismay: Eliminating Coverage-Related Barriers to Hospice Care, 11 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 107, 
136-37 (2010) [hereinafter Cerminara, Pandora’s Dismay].  For more about therapeutic 
jurisprudence and Professor Winick’s astounding legacy, see DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. 
WINICK, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 
(1996); International Network of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, ARIZONA LAW, 
http://www.law.arizona.edu/depts/upr-intj/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2011); Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence Center, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI SCHOOL OF LAW, http://www.law.miami.edu 
/tjcenter/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2011). 
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010) (as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 ) (to be codified as amended in scattered provisions of 42 U.S.C.).  
Commentators have suggested alternative popular names, including “Americare,” in an effort to 
better convey the true impact of this legislation on the American healthcare system through its 
name. See William M. Sage, Why the Affordable Care Act Needs a Better Name:  ‘Americare’, 29 
HEALTH AFF. 1496 (2010).  At the time of this writing, however, the public does not seem to 
have latched onto one consistent name when referring to this historic legislation. 
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ensured that President Barack Obama will go down in history as the president 
who achieved health care coverage reforms on the most significant scale since 
President Lyndon Johnson’s establishment of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965.2  
Approaching health care reform by focusing on health insurance,3 the 
Affordable Care Act should increase the number of Americans who have 
health care coverage and could change the way many Americans obtain that 
coverage. 
 With respect to end-of-life care, the Affordable Care Act focuses 
significantly on coverage of one medical specialty—hospice care.  While also 
addressing issues of hospice quality assessment, data collection methods, and 
rate adjustments,4 the Act implicitly recognizes the value in accessing hospice 
care as soon as possible.5  Once patients have accessed hospice care, however, 
the Act signals Congressional suspicion about hospices and could negatively 
affect continued access, at least in rural areas.6 
 This Article will examine these portions of the Act, which this author has 
described elsewhere as illustrating how “Congress has given with one hand 
while taking with the other.”7  First, it will explain the system pursuant to 
                                                                                                                           
2. Jonathan Oberlander, Long Time Coming:  Why Health Reform Finally Passed, 29 
HEALTH AFF. 1112, 1112 (2010).  The 907-page-long law encompasses a wide variety of 
subjects, with titles ranging from “Quality, Affordable Health Care for All Americans” to “Role 
of Public Programs” to “Improving the Quality and Efficiency of Health Care” to “Prevention 
of Chronic Disease and Improving Public Health” to “Health Care Workforce” to 
“Transparency and Program Integrity” to “Improving Access to Innovative Medical Therapies.”  
(Also included in the legislation, but of lesser general interest, are titles on “Class Act,” 
“Revenue Provisions,” and “Strengthening Quality, Affordable Health Care for All 
Americans.”).  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat. 119. A version of the 
law as passed in the senate, before reconciliation, is 906 pages, see H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. 
(2010), available at http://democrats.senate.gov/reform/patient-protection-affordable-care-act-
as-passed.pdf. 
3. The Act “focused on broadening access by means of insurance reform and not on 
changing the incentives driving health care treatment and overall spending.”  David A. Hyman, 
Follow the Money: Money Matters in Health Care, Just Like in Everything Else 12 (U. of Ill., Law and 
Economics Research Paper No. LE10-008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1604657.  See also Oberlander, supra note 
2, at 1116 (describing it as “a patchwork, reforming our complex, incoherent insurance 
nonsystem with a complex, somewhat coherent mix of subsidies, regulations, mandates, and 
public and private insurance expansions”). 
4. Kenneth L. Burgess, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and Its Impact on 
Hospice, THE NAT’L L. REV. (July 5, 2010), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/patient-
protection-and-affordable-care-act-and-its-impact-hospice. 
5. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 2302, 3104 (authorizing 
immediate access to concurrent care for children and a demonstration project of the concept for 
adults). For a more thorough discussion of the Act and hospice care, especially its focus on 
fraud and abuse, see infra Section III.A. 
6. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §3132;  infra Part III.B.  
7. Kathy L. Cerminara, Health Care Reform at the End of Life: Giving With One Hand but 
Taking with the Other, AM. SOC’Y OF L., MED. & ETHICS, BLOGS & FORUMS (June 7, 2010), 
http://www.aslme.org/Society_Scholars?post=261 [hereinafter Cerminara Blog]. 
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which Medicare covers the cost of hospice care for patients nearing the end of 
life and how that payment system affects the timing of some patients’ initial 
access to hospice care.  Next, it will laud Congress for using health care reform 
to change that payment system in a way that promotes earlier access to 
hospice care for many patients.  Finally, it will argue that, despite this 
indication that it values hospice care, Congress has over-regulated one aspect 
of it due to suspicion of hospices themselves.  As a result, legal, regulatory, 
and medical professionals should carefully monitor the change Congress has 
made to the law governing continued care of patients already certified for 
hospice benefits.  Without careful monitoring and calibration, the latter change 
could inappropriately chill hospice re-certifications. 
I.  HOSPICE CARE AND MEDICARE COVERAGE 
 Hospice care plays an important role in American health care, and Medicare 
plays an important role in financing hospice care.  Now part of the larger field 
of palliative care, hospice care once was part of a countercultural movement 
protesting the medicalization and over-technicality of death.8  By 2007, 1.4 
million Americans used hospice services,9 and 83.6% of them paid for those 
services through the Medicare program.10  In 2008, Medicare expenditures for 
hospice care exceeded eleven billion dollars, in the form of per diem payments 
to more than 3,300 hospices.11  Although patients receiving hospice care 
historically received it through healthcare institutions,12 most such care today 
involves interdisciplinary teams13 visiting terminally ill patients at home,14 
                                                                                                                           
8. See William G. Bartholome, Physician-Assisted Suicide, Hospice, and Rituals of 
Withdrawal, 24 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 233, 234 (1996) (“In large part, the emergence of hospice 
was a response to a systematic failure by mainstream health care professionals to deal with the 
problems of the dying.”); see also Gary R. Vandenbos et al., An Alternative to Traditional Medical 
Care for the Terminally Ill:  Humanitarian, Policy, and Political Issues in Hospice Care, 37 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 1245, 1245 (1982) (characterizing hospice care in part as a reaction to the 
medical profession’s “orient[ation] toward high technology and the single-minded goal of 
sustaining life rather than toward humane care of dying and incurable patients”). 
9. NAT’L HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE ORG., NHPCO FACTS AND FIGURES: HOSPICE 
CARE IN AMERICA 4 (2009), available at http://www.nhpco.org/files/public/ 
Statistics_Research/NHPCO_facts_and_figures.pdf [hereinafter NHPCO FACTS AND FIGURES]. 
10.  Id. at 10.  
11. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE 
PAYMENT POLICY 141 (2010) [hereinafter MEDPAC 2010].  Hospice payment is per diem, or a 
consistent rate paid for each day of care regardless of the level of care provided that day.  See id. 
at 143.  Use of the term “hospices” here includes not simply freestanding facilities in which 
hospice care is provided but also corporate and government entities that provide hospice care to 
patients at home or within hospitals.  See id. at 149 (detailing the rise in type and number of 
hospices from 2001-2008).  
12. See Lenora Finn Paradis & Scott B. Cummings, The Evolution of Hospice in America 
Toward Organizational Homogeneity, 27 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 370, 371 (1986); see also 
Cerminara, Pandora’s Dismay, supra note *, at 114-15. 
13. As part of hospice care, Medicare pays for a variety of services in addition to 
physician and nursing care, drugs, and medical supplies; it also covers short-term inpatient and 
respite care, 42 C.F.R. §§ 418.202(e), 418.108(b) (2010), homemaker and home health aide 
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where they assist patients, patients’ families, and others caring for those 
patients throughout the dying process.15  Currently, the rules governing 
Medicare coverage of hospice care ensure that only deserving patients have 
access to it, but also inhibit of some deserving patients from receiving it. 
A.  Current Medicare Coverage Rules 
 Whether Medicare will cover hospice care for a patient depends on the 
results of a three-step inquiry.  First, the patient must be eligible for Medicare 
benefits in general.16  Second, the patient must be “terminally ill” within the 
meaning of the law governing Medicare benefits.17  Finally, the patient must 
elect Medicare coverage of hospice care by signing a statement acknowledging 
that “certain Medicare services . . . are waived by the election [of hospice 
care].”18  Specifically, a patient must waive Medicare payment for “treatment 
of the terminal condition . . . or a related condition,”19 and instead ask 
Medicare to pay “any expenses incurred for items or services . . . which are . . . 
                                                                                                                           
services, § 418.202(g), counseling (including social worker assistance), § 418.202(b), (d), and 
physical, occupational, and speech/language services as appropriate, § 418.202(h). 
14. According to the National Hospice and Palliative Care Organization (NHPCO), 
in 2008, 68.8% of hospice care was provided at patients’ places of residences, meaning “the 
place the patient calls ‘home.’”  NHPCO FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 9, at 6. Most 
Americans wish to die at home.  Cerminara, Pandora’s Dismay, supra note *, at 141. 
15. See 42 C.F.R. § 418.56(a)(1) (2010) (Medicare regulation requiring interdisciplinary 
team to “work together to meet the physical, medical, psychosocial, emotional, and spiritual 
needs of the hospice patients and families facing terminal illness and bereavement”). 
16. 42 C.F.R. § 418.20(a); see also CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T 
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PUB. NO. 100-01, MEDICARE GENERAL INFORMATION, 
ELIGIBILITY AND ENTITLEMENT ch. 1 §10.1 (2006), available at 
https://www.cms.gov/manuals/downloads/ge101c01.pdf [hereinafter MEDICARE GENERAL 
INFORMATION]. 
17. 42 C.F.R. § 418.3 (2010).  Because of the fragmented nature of the law governing 
health care, a patient may be “terminally ill” for one purpose but not for another, since the 
definition of the term can and does change from setting to setting.  While this is the Medicare 
definition, some states’ advance directive statutes may define the term as “a condition . . . from 
which there is no reasonable medical probability of recovery and which, without treatment, can 
be expected to cause death.”  E.g. FLA. STAT. § 765.101(17) (2010).  To take advantage of the 
Oregon Death With Dignity Act, a patient must be “terminally ill,” defined by that state in that 
circumstance as “an incurable and irreversible disease that has been medically confirmed and 
will, within reasonable medical judgment, produce death within six months.”  OR. REV. STAT. 
§127.800(12) (2009).   
18. 42 C.F.R. § 418.24(b)(3) (2010).  The statement also memorializes the patient’s 
acknowledgment that “he or she has been given a full understanding of the palliative rather than 
curative nature of hospice care, as it relates to the individual’s terminal illness.”  Id. § 
418.24(b)(2). 
19. Id. § 418.24(d)(2); see also CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SRVS., DEP’T OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SRVS., MEDICARE & YOU 27, (2011), available at 
http://www.medicare.gov/publications/pubs/pdf/10050.pdf [hereinafter MEDICARE & YOU]. 
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reasonable and necessary for the palliation or management of [his or her] 
terminal illness.”20 
 To be eligible for Medicare benefits generally, a patient must fall into one of 
three categories.  The first way to qualify is to be sixty-five years of age or 
older and to have paid (or have a spouse who has paid) into the Social Security 
system for a specified amount of time.21  Second, a patient may qualify if he or 
she is under sixty-five years of age but has qualified for disability income 
pursuant to the Social Security Act.22  Finally, any patient with end-stage renal 
disease (kidney failure necessitating dialysis or a transplant) qualifies for 
Medicare coverage.23 
 Eligibility for Medicare coverage of hospice benefits additionally requires 
certification of a patient as being terminally ill.  To be considered “terminally 
ill” for purposes of Medicare hospice coverage, an individual must have “a 
medical prognosis that his or her life expectancy is [six] months or less if the 
illness runs its normal course.”24  Certification of terminal illness is the 
responsibility of the medical director of the hospice from which the individual 
intends to receive hospice care, another physician associated with the hospice, 
or the patient's attending physician.25  A “physician” is anyone “legally 
authorized to practice by the State . . . who is acting within the scope of his or 
her license,”26 which means by definition that, in addition to doctors, nurse 
practitioners empowered by applicable state law to make such determinations 
are considered to be “physicians.”  “Attending physician” is the term used to 
refer to the physician of medicine or osteopathy whom the patient identified at 
the time of electing to receive hospice care as having the most significant role 
in his or her care,27 which again can include a nurse practitioner acting within 
the scope of his or her practice.28 
 The Medicare hospice benefit continues as long as the patient continues to 
meet the initial qualifications for eligibility for hospice.29  A patient is no 
longer eligible for Medicare payment for hospice care if his or her condition 
                                                                                                                           
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(C) (2006). 
21. 42 C.F.R. § 406.10(a) (2010); MEDICARE & YOU, supra note 19, at 18. 
22. 42 C.F.R. § 406.12 (2010); MEDICARE & YOU, supra note 19, at 18. 
23. 42 C.F.R. § 406.13 (2010); MEDICARE & YOU, supra note 19, at 19. 
24. 42 C.F.R. § 418.3 (2010); MEDICARE GENERAL INFORMATION, supra note 16, at 
ch. 1 §10.1.  
25. 42 C.F.R. § 418.22(c) (2010); see 42 C.F.R. § 418.25 (2010). Initial certification 
requires two physicians, while later recertifications require only one physician.  See MEDPAC 
2010, supra note 11, at 143.  
26. 42 C.F.R. § 410.20(b) (2010).  
27. 42 C.F.R. § 418.3 (2010).  
28..“Section 408(a) of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003 (Pub. L. 108–173) (MMA) amended the term ‘attending physician’ at 
section 1861(dd)(3)(B) of the Act specifically for hospices to allow nurse practitioners to 
function as a patient’s attending physician if the patient identifies the nurse practitioner as 
such.”  Medicare and Medicaid Programs: Hospice Conditions of Participation, 73 Fed. Reg. 
32088, 32090 (June 5, 2008) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 418).  “We also do not believe that it 
is necessary to state that a nurse practitioner may act on behalf of the attending physician in the 
attending physician’s absence.”  Id. 
29. 42 C.F.R. § 418.24(c) (2010). 
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has improved so that he or she no longer meets the definition of terminally 
ill.30  If the patient continues to meet the definition, however, he or she is 
eligible for two initial ninety-day periods of hospice care and an unlimited 
number of sixty-day periods after the initial 180 days.31  At the beginning of 
each of these periods, a physician or nurse practitioner must recertify the 
patient as being terminally ill32 and must ensure that documentation to that 
effect appears in the patient's medical record.33  The overall effect is that 
physicians and nurse practitioners may recertify patients for hospice care as 
many times as they meet the requirements, resulting in some patients receiving 
hospice care for years.34 
 The mere fact that individual patients can receive unlimited Medicare 
hospice benefits does not mean that Medicare spending on hospice benefits is 
unchecked.  In an attempt to control the overall amount spent on hospice 
care, Congress and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
have established aggregate caps on benefit dollars that any one hospice can 
claim during a fiscal year.35  One cap, which regulators state does not often 
affect hospices in practice, “limits the number of days of inpatient care a 
hospice may provide to not more than [twenty] percent of its total Medicare 
patient care days.”36  The second cap apparently is more important in 
operation.  Each fiscal year, HHS limits the aggregate Medicare payments a 
hospice can receive.37  If a hospice’s total payments divided by the total 
number of Medicare beneficiaries it serves exceeds that annual cap amount, 
then the hospice must pay the excess back to HHS.38 
                                                                                                                           
30. 42 C.F.R. §§ 418.26(a)(2), (c)(1) (2010); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID 
SRVS., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PUB. NO. 100-02, MEDICARE BENEFIT POLICY 
MANUAL ch. 9, § 10 (2004), available at http://www.cms.gov/manuals/downloads/ 
bp102c09.pdf [hereinafter MEDICARE BENEFIT POLICY MANUAL]. If a patient is no longer 
eligible for the hospice benefit, the Medicare program will pay for the patient's care pursuant to 
his original Medicare benefits.  42 C.F.R. § 418.26(c) (2010); MEDICARE BENEFIT POLICY 
MANUAL, supra, at ch. 9, § 10. 
31. 42 C.F.R. § 418.21 (2010).  See also MEDICARE BENEFIT POLICY MANUAL, supra 
note 30, at ch. 9, § 10. 
32. 42 C.F.R. § 418.22(a).  See also MEDICARE BENEFIT POLICY MANUAL, supra note 
30, at ch. 9, § 20.1.  
33. 42 C.F.R. § 418.22(d) (2010).  As to written clarification, see MEDICARE BENEFIT 
POLICY MANUAL, supra note 30, at ch. 9, § 20.1.  See infra text accompanying notes 122-23 about 
recent regulatory changes in what that documentation must be. 
34. Cf. Stephen R. Connor et al., Comparing Hospice and Nonhospice Patient Survival Among 
Patients Who Die Within a Three-Year Window, 33 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 238, 242 (2007) 
(reporting mean numbers of days of survival in hospice as high as 514). 
35. See MEDPAC 2010, supra note 11, at 144.  Congress initially approved Medicare 
coverage of hospice care costs because it saw hospice care as cost-effective.  See Cerminara, 
Pandora’s Dismay, supra note *, at 132. 
36. MEDPAC 2010, supra note 11, at 144. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 145. 
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B.  Problems With Those Rules 
 Hospice care provides well-documented benefits to patients, families and 
caregivers when patients near the end of life.39  It permits patients to exercise 
more control over their circumstances near the end of life, which benefits 
them psychologically.40 Through a team-based, interdisciplinary approach, 
individual hospice care providers “act as guides into death, offering information, 
support, and guidance from the perspectives of persons who are familiar with 
the dying process” to patients, families, and caregivers.41 Families and 
caregivers can benefit from services such as counseling42 and respite care, 
which is short-term, inpatient care designed to give patients’ caregivers short 
breaks from the stresses of caregiving.43  For patients, the psychological 
benefits of hospice care can result in physical benefits, such as lower blood 
pressure, increased efficacy of medications intended to relieve physical pain, 
and stronger immune systems.44 
 Studies have demonstrated that healthcare professionals fail to recommend 
hospice care as soon as they could, at least partly because of the confusion 
resulting from the current payment system’s false dichotomy45 between 
curative and palliative treatment.  Nurses, nurse managers, and social workers 
treating patients with end-stage renal disease, for example, have been shown to 
be confused about the Medicare rules requiring patients to renounce curative 
treatment to receive the hospice benefit, and that confusion has affected 
referrals to hospice care.46  One physician has attributed late referral to hospice 
                                                                                                                           
39. Cerminara, Pandora’s Dismay, supra note *, at 117-23.  See Elizabeth L. Ciemins et 
al., An Evaluation of the Advanced Illness Management (AIM) Program:  Increasing Hospice Utilization in 
the San Francisco Bay Area, 9 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 1401, 1402 (2006) (“[A]voiding the cost of 
hospital-based life-saving procedures is not the only issue; more importantly, invasive inpatient 
care often causes distress, pain and discomfort to patients and their families.  Simply stated, 
hospice is generally a low-cost, high-benefit option.”) (footnote omitted). 
40. Cerminara, Pandora’s Dismay, supra note *, at 119. 
41. Id. at 121 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
42. “Counseling” is available and reimbursable for both terminally ill patients and 
their families, as indicated by the inclusion of the following in the list of “covered services”: 
 
Counseling services provided to the terminally ill individual and the family members or 
other persons caring for the individual at home. Counseling, including dietary counseling, 
may be provided both for the purpose of training the individual's family or other 
caregiver to provide care, and for the purpose of helping the individual and those caring 
for him or her to adjust to the individual's approaching death. 
 
42 C.F.R. § 418.202(d) (2010).  A more specific sort of counseling, bereavement counseling, is a 
required hospice service but it is not reimbursable.  42 C.F.R. § 418.204(c) (2010). 
43. 42 C.F.R. § 418.204(b) (2010) (“Respite care is short-term inpatient care provided 
to the individual only when necessary to relieve the family members or other persons caring for 
the individual.”).  See also DANIEL R. LEVINSON, INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVS., OEI-02-06-00222, HOSPICE BENEFICIARIES’ USE OF RESPITE CARE  2 (2008).   
44. Cerminara, Pandora’s Dismay, supra note *, at 122-23.
45. See id. at 111-27, 136-48 (discussing the false dichotomy). 
46. Kimberly F. Thompson et al., Hospice and ESRD:  Knowledge Deficits and 
Underutilization of Program Benefits, 35 NEPHROLOGY NURSING J. 461, 465 (2008). 
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care, in part, to the false dichotomy inherent in Medicare’s payment structure 
as well as to “the mistaken view that patients [in hospice] must have a do-not-
resuscitate order,”47 which could be related to the requirement that patients 
must renounce curative treatment. 
 On the patient side as well, having to renounce all curative efforts before 
Medicare will pay for hospice care may result in patient delay in accessing 
hospice care even if healthcare professionals have discussed that option in a 
timely fashion.  Elisabeth Kübler-Ross identified five stages of dying, with the 
final one being acceptance; yet some patients never reach acceptance at all.48  
To renounce curative treatment would require accepting impending death, so 
requiring patients to reach acceptance before accessing hospice care, at best, 
postpones their initial election of Medicare payment for such services.49  Due 
to a variety of cultural influences, some Hispanic and African-American 
patients may never be willing to renounce curative care, even after they have 
accepted impending death.50  In other words, the current Medicare payment 
system, which requires Medicare beneficiaries to accept the inevitability of 
their deaths before Medicare will pay for hospice care,51 deprives patients of 
                                                                                                                           
47. Gail Gazelle, Understanding Hospice – An Underutilized Option for Life’s Final Chapter, 
357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 321, 322 (2007). 
48. See generally ELISABETH KÜBLER-ROSS, ON DEATH AND DYING: WHAT THE DYING 
HAVE TO TEACH DOCTORS, NURSES, CLERGY AND THEIR OWN FAMILIES (40th Anniversary ed., 
Routledge 2009) (1970) (recognizing the five stages as: denial and isolation, anger, bargaining, 
depression, and acceptance).  See also id. at 32 (“Denial, at least partial denial, is used by almost 
all patients, not only during the first stages of illness or following confrontation, but also later 
on from time to time.”).  Of two hundred terminally ill patients Kübler-Ross studied, three 
attempted to deny they were dying until the very end.  Id.  “If a patient has had enough time . . . 
and has been given some help in working through the previously described stages, he will reach 
a stage during which he is neither depressed nor angry about his ‘fate.”’  Id. at 91 (emphasis 
added). That stage is acceptance.  Id.  
49. See Ciemins et al., supra note 39, at 1402 (“Although the hospice benefit can be 
revoked at any time, this mandatory provision deters many patients and families from electing 
hospice treatment.”); Richard D. Brumley et al., Effectiveness of a Home-Based Palliative Care Program 
for End-of-Life, 6 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 715, 717 (2003) (studying concurrent curative and palliative 
care at Kaiser Permanente in Southern California).  Brumley et al. envisioned the program they 
were studying as introducing a “‘hospice philosophy’ . . . without the negative connotation of 
‘giving up’ that is often associated with hospice.”  Id.  Their study used the term “restorative 
treatment” in describing the sort of care patients could continue to receive, but in doing so they 
also noted that “patients do not have to forego curative care for palliative care services.”  Id. 
50. See Alina M. Perez & Kathy L. Cerminara, La Caja de Pandora:   Improving Access to 
Hospice Care Among Hispanic and African-American Patients, 10 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 255, 
271-81 (2010).  
51. See Cerminara, Pandora’s Dismay, supra note *, at 148.  See also Brumley et al., supra 
note 49, at 717 (describing the Kaiser Palliative Care Program as introducing a “hospice 
philosophy . . . without the negative connotation of ‘giving up’”). 
Rules requiring the forgoing of curative treatment to have hospice care covered tend 
to apply even to patients who do not qualify for Medicare, since many private insurers covering 
hospice care adopt the same coverage rules.  Cerminara, Pandora’s Dismay, supra note *, at 108-
09. But see id. at 109 n.11 (citing OFFICE OF DISABILITY, AGING & LONG-TERM CARE POLICY, 
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valuable physical and psychological benefits at a time those benefits could 
greatly help ease the dying process. 
II. CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT OF CONCURRENT CARE  
AS A HOSPICE MODEL 
 Buried within the Affordable Care Act are two provisions that signal 
congressional support for significantly revising the Medicare payment system 
for hospice care in a way that could increase patients’ access to it.52 
Specifically, Congress immediately adopted in Medicaid, and moved toward 
adopting in Medicare, a model of hospice coverage it called concurrent care 
(also sometimes called ‘open access’).53  Pursuant to this model, Medicaid pays, 
and Medicare eventually could pay, for the receipt of concurrent curative 
treatment and hospice care rather than requiring patients to waive payment for 
curative treatment to have Medicaid or Medicare pay for their hospice 
care.54  In section 2302, Congress immediately permitted children receiving 
health care coverage through Medicaid and state Children’s Health Insurance 
Programs to have hospice care covered without their parents waiving payment 
for curative treatment for their terminal illnesses.55  In section 3140, Congress 
authorized a three-year Medicare hospice concurrent care demonstration 
program for adults.56  At the conclusion of the demonstration program, the 
Secretary of HHS will provide an independent evaluation to “determine 
whether the demonstration program has improved patient care, quality of life, 
and cost-effectiveness for Medicare beneficiaries participating in [it].”57 
 
 
                                                                                                                           
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HOSPICE BENEFITS AND UTILIZATION IN THE LARGE 
EMPLOYER MARKET 3 (2000) (noting that only two of nine large employers with benefit plans 
covering hospice care researchers interviewed used a Medicare-like model)). 
52. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 3140(a), 
2302, 124 Stat. 119, 440, 293 (2010).  As previously noted, supra text accompanying note 4, the 
Act addressed hospice care in additional provisions as well.  Discussion of those additional 
provisions, however, is beyond the scope of this Article. 
53. See Alexi A. Wright & Ingrid T. Katz, Letting Go of the Rope – Aggressive Treatment, 
Hospice Care, and Open Access, 357 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 324, 324 (2007). 
54. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3140(a). 
55. Id. § 2302.  See also, Letter from Cindy Mann, Director, Center for Medicaid, CHIP 
and Survey & Certification, to State Health Officials and State Medicaid Directors (Sept. 9, 
2010), available at  http://www.aucd.org/docs/policy/health_care/Hospice%20Care%20for 
%20Children.pdf.  As a joint federal-state program, administration of Medicaid is governed by 
state law in accordance with federal guidelines; states that cover hospice care through their 
Medicaid programs generally cover that care in accordance with the same rules Medicare uses.  
See Cerminara, Pandora’s Dismay, supra note *, at 108-09. 
56. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3140.  See also Kevin B. O’Reilly, 
Medicare to Test Allowing More Than Palliative Care in Hospice, AMERICAN MEDICAL NEWS (May 24, 
2010), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2010/05/24/prsb0524.htm.  
57. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3140(b). 
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A.  Elimination of a False Dichotomy in the Payment Rules 
 Although Medicare and most private insurers do not pay for it at this time, 
concurrent care, or the provision of both curative and palliative care at once, is 
not a new concept.  It is difficult to label some care as clearly “curative” rather 
than “palliative,” and some types of care (for example, chemotherapy and 
radiation) are curative in some instances and palliative in others.  Therefore, 
providing both at once through a concurrent care model simply eliminates a 
false dichotomy among types of treatment existing in current law.58  Beginning 
in the early 2000s, a few hospices and healthcare insurers have authorized such 
simultaneous coverage for both hospice care and curative treatment for 
terminal illnesses.59  Their early efforts merit summary. 
 In 2004, Aetna developed a two-pronged approach to liberalizing access to 
hospice care.  It “launched a comprehensive case management . . . program 
targeted specifically to patients with advanced illness and their families,”60 
while simultaneously “pilot[ing] a benefit design change among [thirteen] large 
employers that liberalized hospice and respite benefits for seriously ill patients 
and families.”61  Through the former program, which it called the 
Compassionate Care Program, nurse case managers with training in palliative 
care reached out to those dealing with terminal illnesses, educating patients, 
families, and caregivers about the disease process, advance directives, sources 
of community support, pain control, medication management, the possibility 
of care at home, and the availability of respite care.62  Shortly after instituting 
the Compassionate Care Program, Aetna also began providing expanded 
hospice and respite care benefits for thirteen large employers.63  Whereas 
Aetna had only previously covered the cost of hospice care for patients within 
six months of death (mimicking the Medicare requirement), under this 
program it began covering such costs for patients within twelve months of 
death.64  Additionally, it permitted “continued receipt of curative treatment 
while also receiving hospice services,” eliminated limits on the length of stay 
for inpatient hospice care and on the amount that could be spent on 
                                                                                                                           
58. See Cerminara, Pandora’s Dismay, supra note *, at 145-46 (discussing integration of 
palliative care with routine care for treatment of patients with cancer). 
59. See generally Claire M. Spettell et al., A Comprehensive Case Management Program to 
Improve Palliative Care, 12 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 827 (2009) (studying Aetna’s comprehensive case 
management and concurrent benefits approach, beginning in 2004); see, e.g.,Wright & Katz, supra 
note 53, at 326-27 (describing a range of such programs); Ciemins et al., supra note 39, at 1403 
(studying “a home-based palliative care program . . . designed to provide concurrent disease-
modifying and comfort care to home health patients with advanced illness in an open 
community-based system of care”). 
60. Spettell et al., supra note 59, at 827. 
61. Id. at 828. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
 64. Id.  
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outpatient hospice care, covered fifteen days per year of respite care to benefit 
patients’ families, and covered bereavement services.65 
 Similarly, healthcare providers have attempted to make hospice-like 
palliative care services available to some patients receiving curative treatment, 
although they cannot control what costs insurance companies will cover in the 
same way that an insurer such as Aetna does.66  Such provider efforts, 
sometimes termed “palliative care transition programs,” “create a bridge from 
hospitalization or home health to hospice . . . [by providing] a blended model 
of care combining palliative with curative practices.”67  Kaiser Permanente 
(Kaiser) in Southern California engaged in one of the earliest attempts to 
marry palliative care with the continuation of curative treatments.68  The 
process was most likely aided by the fact that the same entity provides 
coverage and care in a staff-model health maintenance organization such as 
Kaiser.69 
 Kaiser researchers at three medical centers in Southern California believed 
that “a new continuum must be developed that provides a blended model of 
care, introducing palliative measures into curative practices.”70 Therefore, they 
established what they called the Palliative Care Program to provide the 
psychosocial and spiritual support of hospice care without requiring patients in 
the program to forgo curative care.71  The Palliative Care Program also 
emphasized relief of physical pain and other physical symptoms associated 
with the patients’ terminal diseases.72  Over two years, researchers studied 558 
subjects, 210 of whom were designated in the Palliative Care Program and 348 
of whom were designated in a comparison group,73 in an effort to demonstrate 
that such a program would be effective in both satisfying patients’ needs and 
reducing total medical services used during the last months of patients’ lives.74 
 At Massachusetts General Hospital in Boston, researchers were convinced 
that “[t]o have a meaningful effect on patients’ quality of life and end-of-life 
care, palliative care services must be provided earlier in the course of the 
                                                                                                                           
65. Id. 
66. To some extent, health care providers can control whether insurance companies 
will pay for services they have provided, by choosing how to identify those services when billing 
for them.  Concerns about the patients’ insurer not paying for some services they provided did 
not affect the providers in the Kaiser study, as Kaiser’s was a “closed-system managed care 
organization,” which means not only that it “provides an array of services across the continuum 
of care to its members,” Brumley et al., supra note 49, at 722, 723, but also that it addresses 
questions of coverage at the time it decides whether care will be provided. 
67. Ciemins et al., supra note 39, at 1403. 
68. See generally Brumley et al., supra note 49. 
69. Cf. Spettell et al., supra note 59, at 831 (explaining that “[m]anaged care 
organizations, with case management systems and processes that enable them to communicate 
directly with physicians and patients, are in a position to facilitate hospice use”).  
70. Brumley et al., supra note 49, at 716 (footnote omitted). 
71. Id. at 717. 
72. Id. at 718. 
73. Id. at 719.  
74. Id. at 716. 
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disease.”75  To test this hypothesis, they studied the effect on cancer patients 
of providing “early palliative care integrated with standard oncologic care,” as 
compared with the effect on cancer patients of standard oncologic care 
alone.76  They randomly assigned patients who had received lung cancer 
diagnoses likely to lead to death within a year to either a control group, which 
received standard oncological treatment, or a test group, which received 
consultations from a palliative care team in addition to the standard 
oncological treatment.77  During the palliative care consultations, “[s]pecific 
attention was paid to assessing physical and psychosocial symptoms, 
establishing goals of care, assisting with decision making regarding treatment, 
and coordinating care on the basis of the individual needs of the patient[s].”78 
 As a final example, health care providers in the San Francisco area created 
an Advanced Illness Management (AIM) program to serve as “a bridge 
between curative and comfort care.”79  Patients participating in the AIM study 
had advanced illnesses and were receiving home care, although the majority of 
them were “not yet eligible or ready for hospice.”80  Nurse case managers 
participating in AIM received training in a variety of palliative care and 
psychosocial topics81 before becoming AIM patients’ primary sources of 
care.82  Patients participating in AIM did not have to forgo curative treatment; 
“[i]nstead, the value of current treatment was discussed, and when appropriate, 
alternatives were considered.”83  
 In sum, the concept of concurrent care is not a novel one, as insurers, 
healthcare providers, and other researchers have studied it, and policymakers 
have been advocating its use for some time.84  The Affordable Care Act’s 
                                                                                                                           
75. Jennifer S. Temel et al., Early Palliative Care for Patients with Metastatic Non-Small-Cell 
Lung Cancer, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 733, 734 (2010). 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
79. Ciemins et al., supra note 39, at 1403.  See also Harris Meyer, Changing the 
Conversation in California About Care Near the End of Life, 30 HEALTH AFF. 390 (2011) (describing 
same program). 
80. Home health nurses universally indicated that they would not be surprised if those 
patients died within six to 12 months. Ciemins et al., supra note 39, at 1405. 
81. Specifically, each nurse case manager received eight hours of training covering 
these areas:  the definition and philosophy of palliative care; the AIM program itself; insurance 
coverage; home care regulations; hospice regulations; AIM’s interfaces with patients and with 
hospice; “operations, including forms, orders, [and] desired outcomes;” advance directives, 
advance care planning, “facilitating difficult conversations,” clinical issues regarding death and 
dying, ethical issues regarding death and dying, pain control and symptom management; and 
administrative policies relating to these issues.  Id. at 1404. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. See, e.g., Advance Planning and Compassionate Care Act of 2009, H.R. 2911, 
111th Cong. § 226 (2009); Healthy American Act, S. Res. 334, 110th Cong. § 452 (2007); H.R. 
435, 2009 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2009), available at 
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authorization of coverage of concurrent care for terminally ill children and 
establishment of Medicare hospice benefit concurrent care demonstration 
programs for terminally ill adults will pave the way for the public sector to 
develop evidence in the same way the private sector has begun to do.  Once 
HHS, particularly the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), has 
such data in hand, Congress will be in a better position to consider whether it 
should amend the law governing the Medicare hospice benefit to cover 
concurrent curative and palliative care for adults. 
B.  Benefits to Both Patients and the Health Care System 
 The Act’s immediate authorization of benefits for concurrent curative and 
palliative care for children and establishment of a concurrent care 
demonstration program for adults are substantial developments in health care. 
Eliminating the false dichotomy between curative and palliative treatment is 
likely very beneficial.  First, it is the most efficient path to early hospice care 
for most patients.  Second, removing the dichotomy may encourage hospice 
utilization among patients in racial and ethnic groups that traditionally have 
not embraced hospice care.85  Moreover, the healthcare system as a whole 
could benefit because, although it seems paradoxical, providing both curative 
and palliative care at the beginning of patients’ hospice care experiences can 
reduce overall health care spending near the end of life.86 
 The AIM study87 demonstrated that concurrent care led to earlier hospice 
referrals generally and resulted in a huge increase in the number of African-
American patients accessing hospice care.  The study included three categories 
of terminally ill patients:  those participating in the AIM program; those 
receiving the usual care provided by the same pool of home healthcare 
workers as those providing the AIM services (the Usual Care I group); and 
those receiving the usual care provided by a different pool of home healthcare 
workers (the Usual Care II group). Sixty percent more African-American 
patients participating in AIM than receiving care in the Usual Care I group 
went into hospice care, and seventy-three percent more went into hospice care 
than the Usual Care II group.88  The percentage of African-American patients 
in AIM who received hospice care was virtually identical to the percentage of 
                                                                                                                           
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2010/bills/House/H-435.pdf (enacted May 18, 2009).  See 
generally Cerminara, Pandora’s Dismay, supra note *, at 146-47 n.209. 
85. See Perez & Cerminara, supra note 50, at 291; Brad Stuart et al., CHOICES: 
Promoting Early Access to End-of-Life Care Through Home-Based Transition Management, 6 J. 
PALLIATIVE MED. 671, 677-78 (2003); Haiden A. Huskamp et al., Providing Care at the End of Life: 
Do Medicare Rules Impede Good Care?, 20 HEALTH AFF. 204, 211 (2001). 
86. “[G]enerally speaking, foregoing expensive curative treatment in favor of less-
intensive hospice services will reduce overall costs.”  Cerminara Blog, supra note 7.  It seems that 
patients who access hospice care earlier may be willing to renounce use of expensive, intensive 
care earlier overall.  See infra text accompanying notes 102-114. 
87. See generally supra text accompanying notes 79-83. 
88. Ciemins et al., supra note 39, at 1408. 
456 Widener Law Review    [Vol. 17: 443 
 
 
Caucasian patients in that program who received hospice care.89  This result 
stands in stark contrast to general statistics demonstrating a much lower rate 
of hospice utilization among patients of African-American heritage than 
among Caucasians.90  Whether this finding was attributable to increased 
knowledge about hospice as an option, or to the elimination of the 
requirement that curative treatment be renounced,91 it represented an increase 
in patient access to the positive physical and psychological benefits hospice 
care provides. 
 The Massachusetts General study92 showed that terminally ill patients with 
non-small-cell lung cancer who received early access to palliative care 
integrated with standard oncologic care lived longer than those who received 
only standard oncologic care.93  The patients receiving concurrent palliative 
and curative treatment in that study survived approximately two months 
longer than did those receiving only curative treatment, even though they 
generally chose less aggressive care near the end of life than the other group of 
patients did.94  Those patients also demonstrated “clinically meaningful 
improvements in quality of life and mood,” and they had their resuscitation 
preferences noted in their medical records more often than patients receiving 
standard care.95  The researchers concluded:  “Early integration of palliative 
care for patients with metastatic non-small-cell lung cancer is a clinically 
meaningful and feasible care model that has effects on survival and quality of 
life that are similar to the effects of first-line chemotherapy in such patients.”96  
While the study had some limitations, “the results nonetheless offer great 
promise for alleviating distress in patients with metastatic disease and 
addressing critical concerns regarding the use of health care services at the end 
of life.”97 
 Acknowledging that there exist “concerns regarding the use of health care 
services at the end of life”98 opens the door to fear about rationing care.99  
Were concerns about utilization the only rationale for concurrent care, it is 
                                                                                                                           
89. Id. at 1409. 
90. See Perez & Cerminara, supra note 50, at 257-58 (also discussing low rates of 
hospice access among Hispanic patients). 
91. Commentators have hypothesized both as possibilities.  See Ciemins et al., supra 
note 39, at 1409. 
92. See supra text accompanying notes 75-78. 
93. Temel et al., supra note 75, at 739.  
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 741 (footnotes omitted).  
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. See generally Uwe E. Reinhardt, End-of-Life Care:  Where Ethics Meet Economics, N.Y. 
TIMES, ECONOMIX (Aug. 14, 2009, 6:00 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/ 
08/14/end-of-life-care-where-ethics-meet-economics (describing problems that arise with the 
development of expensive new medical technologies, including limited accessibility and high 
costs).  
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likely that many people would protest.  After all, during the debates over 
health care reform, the mere inclusion of a provision authorizing physician 
payment for time spent discussing advance directives and other end-of-life 
issues with patients prompted allegations that the government sought to 
establish “death panels” to limit care to the elderly and the terminally ill.100  
Nevertheless, it is appropriate to factor resource utilization data into the 
equation when evaluating concurrent care as a model for hospice care because 
when Congress originally approved Medicare funding of hospice care, it did so 
because that care was more cost-effective than aggressive care near the end of 
life.101 
 Concurrent care may advance that same goal of cost-effectiveness, as 
counterintuitive as that seems, for studies indicate that it could save money or 
at least be budget-neutral.  For example, among Aetna beneficiaries 
participating in the Compassionate Care Program, patient use of hospice care 
increased greatly, and acute care and critical care utilization decreased.102 Since 
acute and critical care cost more than hospice care, the Aetna researchers 
viewed concurrent care as “financially feasible for health plan sponsors, 
insurers and Medicare.”103  Patients participating in the AIM program in San 
Francisco104 entered hospice care at greater rates than those who did not,105 
which is significant in terms of cost because, as noted earlier,106 hospice 
enrollment generally correlates to a reduction in hospital expenditures.107  The 
patients enrolled in Kaiser’s Palliative Care Program, which compared 
concurrent palliative and curative care with a control group, used “significantly 
lower” amounts of acute hospital care and emergency department services; the 
control group racked up “twice as many emergency department visits and four 
                                                                                                                           
100. See, e.g., Kate Snow et al., Experts Debunk Health Care Reform Bill’s ‘Death Panel’ 
Rule, ABC NEWS (Aug. 11, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/Wellness/story?id=8295708 
(describing the outcry over the then-pending 2009 House health care reform bill).  The outcry 
was so great that advocates withdrew the proposal.  See Christi Parsons & Andrew Zajac, Senate 
Committee Scraps Healthcare Provision that Gave Rise to ‘Death Panel’ Claims, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 14, 
2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/14/nation/na-health-end-of-life14.  This was so 
although the idea of paying for such consultations was not a new one.  See, e.g., Reinhardt, supra 
note 99 (noting the resemblance between section 1233 and the Medicare End-of-Life Care 
Planning Act of 2007). This author, for example, proposed such an idea as long ago as 1998.  See 
Kathy L. Cerminara, Eliciting Patient Preferences in Today’s Health Care System, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 688, 696-97 (1998). 
101. See Cerminara, Pandora’s Dismay, supra note *, at 132-33.  
102. See Spettell et al., supra note 59, at 831.   
103. Id. at 831-32. 
104. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text. 
105. See Ciemins et al., supra note 39, at 1407; see also Meyer, supra note 79, at 392. 
106. See Donald H. Taylor, Jr. et al., What Length of Hospice Use Maximizes Reduction in 
Medical Expenditures Near Death in the U.S. Medicare Program, 65 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1466, 1470 
(2007). 
107. Ciemins et al., supra note 39, at 1402.  The AIM researchers intended for further 
studies to establish causation, rather than correlation, and to determine the economic impact of 
the program.  Id. at 1409. 
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times as many hospital days than the palliative care group.”108  The cost of care 
for the patients in the control group thus was almost double that of those in 
the palliative care group,109 while the patients in the palliative care group were 
significantly more satisfied with their care than were the members of the 
control group after sixty days of service.110 
 Similarly, an even more robust and recent study confirms that increasing 
length of hospice stay can decrease the cost of health care for dying patients.  
Taylor et al. studied more than 11,000 Medicare beneficiaries, 1,819 of whom 
were using hospice services at the time of their deaths.111  They found that 
hospice use reduced Medicare expenditures by an average of just over $2,300 
per hospice user.112  The study then took into consideration other statistics, 
such as the amount spent on care immediately prior to those patients’ hospice 
usage, and their results indicated that terminally ill cancer patients receiving 
hospice care for 58 to 103 days prior to death would save Medicare about 
$7,000 each, while patients who are terminally ill with non-cancer diagnoses 
would save Medicare about $3,500 each by receiving hospice care for 50 to 
108 days prior to death.113  The results prompted these researchers to opine 
that “more effort should be put into increasing short [hospice] stays as 
opposed to focusing on shortening long ones.”114 
 In conclusion, promoting earlier initial access to hospice care is a noble goal 
for a variety of reasons.  It facilitates additional psychological and palliative 
care of dying patients during stages at which such care is more meaningful and 
valuable than the last few days of life.  Additionally, doing so serves the overall 
goal of cost-effectiveness.  Therefore, Congress’s authorization of payment for 
concurrent care for children and establishment of a study of concurrent care 
coverage for adults are not likely to increase Medicaid and Medicare care costs 
overall.  While funding concurrent care will increase the length of time most 
patients would receive hospice care, the statistics indicate that short hospice 
stays should increase, for a variety of psychosocial reasons.  Finally, facilitating 
earlier access to hospice care in this way is likely to result in a decrease in costs 
associated with aggressive end-of-life interventions. 
 
 
                                                                                                                           
108. Brumley et al., supra note 49, at 721. “In addition, the palliative care group 
demonstrated statistically significant lower nonacute service use for skilled nursing days and 
physician office visits.”  Id. 
109. The average cost for the control group was $14,570, while the average cost for 
the palliative care group was $7,990.  Id. 
110. Id. at 720. 
111. Taylor et al., supra note 106, at 1470. 
112. Id. at 1471, 1474. 
113. Id. at 1474. 
114. Id. at 1476. 
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III. CONGRESSIONAL SUSPICION OF HOSPICES 
 Even as Congress displayed support for hospice care, it revealed some 
distrust of hospices in the Act.  Section 3132 imposed tighter controls on 
hospice recertifications as of January 1, 2011; physicians and nurse 
practitioners may no longer rely on chart reviews, medical records, or reports 
from aides or others to recertify patients as being terminally ill.115  Rather, they 
must visit patients in person to recertify them as being terminally ill once those 
patients’ initial 180 days of coverage are over.116  Moreover, hospices with 
especially high rates of recertification will be subject to ‘medical review’ of the 
care they provide to recertified patients.117  These provisions stem from 
concerns about fraud and abuse that may be valid, but their broad-brush 
approach could do more harm than good.   A more appropriate alternative 
seems to exist. 
A.  Well-Founded Suspicions 
 Congress enacted section 3132 after years of concern over the rising cost of 
hospice care and agency-level efforts to curb such costs.  The Office of 
Inspector General (OIG) of HHS began studying the hospice benefit in the 
late 1990s, investigating hospice providers as part of its statutory mission to 
“protect the integrity” of HHS programs such as Medicare and Medicaid.118  
Most recently, OIG urged vigilance in guarding against fraud and abuse in the 
hospice setting by continuing “to recommend that CMS strengthen its 
                                                                                                                           
115. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3132, 124 
Stat. 119, 430-32 (2010).   
 116. Id. 
117. Id. The Secretary of HHS will determine the rate of recertification triggering 
review, the form of review, and the procedure to be followed during such a review.  Id. 
118. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., MEDICARE 
HOSPICE CARE: A COMPARISON OF BENEFICIARIES IN NURSING FACILITIES AND BENEFICIARIES 
IN OTHER SETTINGS (2007), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-02-06-00220.pdf 
[hereinafter MEDICARE HOSPICE CARE].   During that time frame, the Office of Inspector 
General, the Health Care Financing Administration, and the Administration on Aging joined 
forces to “combat fraud, waste and abuse in the Medicare and Medicaid programs” through 
Operation Restore Trust.  Office of Inspector General, Publication of the Medicare Advisory 
Bulletin on Hospice Benefits, 60 Fed. Reg. 55721, 55721 (November 2, 1995).  For examples of 
the work that resulted from Operation Restore Trust, see generally OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., 
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., SPECIAL FRAUD ALERT: FRAUD AND ABUSE IN NURSING 
HOME ARRANGEMENTS WITH HOSPICES (1998), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/ 
alertsandbulletins/hospice.pdf; OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVS., MEDICARE HOSPICE BENEFICIARIES: SERVICES AND ELIGIBILITY (1998), available at 
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-04-93-00270.pdf; Memorandum from June Gibbs Brown, 
Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., to Nancy-Ann Min DeParle, Deputy 
Adm’r, Health Care Fin. Admin. (Nov. 4, 1997)  available at  http://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/ 
region5/59600023.pdf; OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 
HOSPICE AND NURSING HOME CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS (1997) available at 
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-05-95-00251.pdf. 
460 Widener Law Review    [Vol. 17: 443 
 
 
monitoring practices for hospice claims,” especially in nursing facilities.119  The 
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), created to advise 
Congress on Medicare issues,120 has expressed similar concern, specifically 
regarding the potential for fraud and abuse among for-profit hospices.121 In 
2008 and 2009, MedPAC recommended what John Iglehart has described as 
“substantial changes designed to improve the accuracy of Medicare payments 
to hospices, increase hospice organizations’ accountability, and ensure greater 
involvement by physicians in end-of-life care.”122 
 MedPAC recommended a number of changes to the way Medicare pays for 
hospice care, two of which relate to increased oversight of providers certifying 
and recertifying patients as terminally ill, and, thus, eligible for Medicare 
hospice benefits.  One recommendation, which CMS adopted through 
rulemaking in 2009, was to require physicians and nurse practitioners to 
provide brief narratives explaining the rationales behind certifications of 
patients as being terminally ill, rather than signing off on such a conclusion in 
patients’ medical records without explanation.123  The other MedPAC 
recommendation, which CMS declined to incorporate into rulemaking,124 was 
the face-to-face encounter requirement that Congress adopted in section 3132 
of the Affordable Care Act.125 
 Regulatory and legislative desire for increased accountability stems from a 
great increase in Medicare spending on hospice care over recent years.  
“Hospice became a Medicare-covered benefit in 1983 primarily because 
Congress saw it as cost effective,”126 yet it requires more and more resources 
each year.  Between 2000 and 2007, Medicare spending on hospice services 
increased from $2.9 billion to about $10 billion.127  In 2008, MedPAC noted 
that “Medicare spending for hospice is expected to more than double in the 
next [ten] years . . . and will account for roughly 2.3 percent of overall 
                                                                                                                           
119. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 
COMPENDIUM OF UNIMPLEMENTED OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS 23 
(2010) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM OF UNIMPLEMENTED RECOMMENDATIONS]. 
120. About Medpac, MEDPAC.GOV, http://www.medpac.gov/about.cfm. (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2011). 
121. See Cerminara Blog, supra note 7. 
122. John K. Iglehart, A New Era of For-Profit Hospice Care – The Medicare Benefit, 360 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2701, 2701 (2009) (footnote omitted).  See generally Cerminara, Pandora’s 
Dismay, supra note *, at 134-35. 
123. Medicare Program; Hospice Wage Index for Fiscal Year 2010, 74 Fed. Reg. 
39384, 39398 (Aug. 6, 2009) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405 and 418).  For background, see 
Cerminara, Pandora’s Dismay, supra note *, at 135-36 n.153. 
124. Hospice Wage Index for Fiscal Year 2010, 74 Fed. Reg. at 39402. 
125. See supra text accompanying notes 115-116. 
126. Cerminara, Pandora’s Dismay, supra note *, at 132. 
127. Iglehart, supra note 122, at 2701-02. 
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Medicare spending in FY 2009.”128  Even if it is an economical form of care,129 
hospice care consumes a significant amount of resources. 
 The increasing costs are due both to the growing number of Medicare 
beneficiaries electing hospice care and to the increased number of days 
hospice beneficiaries, on average, are receiving hospice care.  Between the year 
2000 and the year 2008, the percentage of Medicare decedents who had 
received hospice care rose from twenty-three percent to forty percent.130  The 
provision of hospice care to Medicare beneficiaries increased at an average rate 
of ten percent per year between 2000 and 2007 and still grew, but at the slower 
rate of five and a half percent between 2007 and 2008.131 
 In roughly this same time period, the number of for-profit hospices in the 
marketplace for hospice services has increased significantly.  Between 2001 
and 2008, the total number of hospices in America increased by forty-seven 
percent, from 2,303 to 3,389.132  In that time period, the number of for-profit 
hospices increased by 128 percent, while the number of not-for-profit 
hospices increased by only one percent.133  In raw numbers, this translates into 
an increase of 983 in the number of for-profit hospices, from 765 to 1,748, 
compared to an increase of thirteen in not-for-profit hospices, from 1,184 to 
1,197.134 
 This fact becomes especially interesting when examining MedPAC’s 
findings about hospices that exceed the aggregate cap on Medicare payments 
per beneficiary each hospice may receive.135  In each of the years between 2002 
and 2005, MedPAC determined that more than eighty-four percent of the 
hospices exceeding the cap were for-profit.136  This may be due to patient 
selection because for-profit hospices treated more patients with non-cancer 
terminal illness diagnoses, who typically have longer hospice stays than those 
with cancer diagnoses.137  MedPAC has interpreted its data, however, as 
indicating that, “[a]t the extreme, some hospices may be operating a business 
model based on extending length of stay in hospice to maximize 
profitability.”138 
                                                                                                                           
128. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADIVSORY COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: REFORMING 
THE DELIVERY SYSTEM 203 (2008) [hereinafter MEDPAC 2008] (citation omitted).
129. See NHPCO Facts and Figures, supra note 9, at 11 (citing generally Taylor et al., 
supra note 106). 
130. MEDPAC 2010, supra note 11, at 145. 
131. Id. at 149. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 147.  During that time period, the number of hospices owned by the 
government or others increased by twenty-five percent.  Id.  
134. Id. at 149. 
135. See generally supra text accompanying notes 36-39. 
136. MEDPAC 2008, supra note 128, at 212.   
137. Hospices exceeding the cap treated all patients, regardless of diagnosis, for 
longer periods of time than hospices that were below the cap. MEDPAC 2010, supra note 11, at 
151; MEDPAC 2008, supra note 128, at 214. 
138. Transcript of Presentation at the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 
Public Meeting: Critical Evaluation of the Medicare Hospice Benefit at 175 (Nov. 6, 2008), 
462 Widener Law Review    [Vol. 17: 443 
 
 
 Correctly or not, the mere incorporation of a hospice as a for-profit entity 
(at least a publicly traded one) rather than a not-for-profit one tends to raise 
concerns that the hospice is focused on maximizing profits, perhaps above 
other goals.139  Publicly traded for-profit entities have incentives to both 
“maximize the wealth of their owners” (shareholders) and “mak[e] financial 
decisions that are tailored toward improving the highly watched fiscal quarterly 
earnings.”140  The results of a study in 2005 “suggest[ed] that hospices owned 
by publicly traded companies, regardless of their size, are able to earn higher 
profit margins than either private, for-profit or non-profit hospices.”141  
MedPAC has noted that hospices exceeding the cap are more likely to be for-
profit, freestanding facilities than are hospices below the cap, although its data 
does not distinguish between publicly traded and non-publicly traded for-
profit entities.142 
 Hospices exceeding the cap also have attracted MedPAC attention because 
they discharge many patients alive.  “In 2007, nearly half . . . of all discharges 
by above-cap hospices . . . were live discharges, compared with [sixteen] 
percent in below-cap hospices.”143  Given the notorious difficulty of predicting 
date of death, and patients’ abilities to revoke hospice elections to return to 
conventional treatment, some live discharges from hospice care are normal.144  
Based on the “substantially higher” live discharge rates of above-cap hospices 
and their longer average lengths of stay, however, MedPAC has “questions 
about whether above-cap hospices are admitting patients before they meet the 
hospice eligibility criteria.”145 
                                                                                                                           
available at http://www.medpac.gov/transcripts/1106-1107MedPAC%20final.pdf [hereinafter 
MedPAC Meeting] (statement of Dr. James E. Mathews). 
139.  See Barry M. Kinzbrunner, For Profit vs. Not-for-Profit Hospice: It is the Quality that 
Counts, 5 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 483, 483-84 (2002) (discussing differing interpretations of data 
regarding for-profit hospice providers as compared with not-for-profit hospice providers). 
140. Michael J. McCue & Jon M. Thompson, Operational and Financial Performance of 
Publicly Traded Hospice Companies, 8 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 1196, 1198 (2005) (footnote omitted). 
141. Id. at 1205.  See also Emily J. Cherlin et al., Interdisciplinary Staffing Patterns: Do For-
Profit and Nonprofit Hospices Differ?, 13 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 389, 393 (2010) (finding great 
variation in interdisciplinary staffing patterns by hospice ownership type but not studying the 
impact of such staffing differences); Sean M. O’Neill et al., Paying the Price at the End of Life:  A 
Consideration of Factors that Affect the Profitability of Hospice, 11 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 1002, 1006 
(2009) (finding that for-profit hospices are generally more profitable than not-for-profit 
hospices, although hospice profitability overall is low); Richard C. Lindrooth & Burton A. 
Weisbrod, Do Religious Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizations Respond Differently to Financial Incentives?  
The Hospice Industry, 26 J. HEALTH ECON. 342, 354 (2007) (demonstrating that for-profit hospices 
admit more patients with longer expected lengths of stay than do religious nonprofit hospices). 
142. MedPAC 2010, supra note 11, at 151, 152 (above–cap hospices are also likely to 
have smaller patient loads than below-cap hospices). 
143. Id. at 152.  See also id. (comparing live discharges for above-cap and below-cap 
hospices by diagnosis in Table 2E-7). 
144. Id. at 152. 
145. Id. 
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 CMS’s imposition in 2009 of a narrative requirement for certifying patients 
as being terminally ill partially addressed MedPAC concerns about whether 
above-cap hospices were admitting patients before they met hospice eligibility 
criteria.146 Requiring face-to-face recertification encounters, as Congress has 
done in the Affordable Care Act, seems to be intended as a gap-filler in case 
the narrative requirement does not succeed entirely in preventing hospice 
providers from admitting ineligible patients.  If narrative requirements do not 
block all improper initial certifications, it seems that Congress believes that 
tighter controls on recertifications can approach the problem from the other 
direction, eliminating continuing coverage for patients improperly certified in 
the first place. 
 This reasoning may make sense because OIG has produced evidence that 
hospice providers take insufficient care in documenting certifications and 
recertifications.  In September 2009, it reported the results of a study it 
undertook of Medicare-funded hospice care in nursing homes in the year 
2006,147 concluding that “[i]n 2006, 82 percent of Medicare hospice claims did 
not meet one or more coverage requirements.”148 
 According to some representatives of the hospice industry, such 
noncompliance stems from lack of physician engagement.149  In November 
2008, MedPAC heard “anecdotal reports of some hospices never discharging 
patients for improved prognosis, enrolling patients who had been turned away 
or discharged by other hospices, disregarding the eligibility guidelines . . . , 
aggressively marketing to individuals likely to have long lengths of stay, . . . or 
marketing hospice to patients without mentioning the terminal illness 
requirement.”150  One participant in those 2008 hearings, discussing 
MedPAC’s proposal that initial certifications include narratives, indicated that 
the panelists generally supported increased accountability.151  Therefore, based 
on industry representatives themselves, it is appropriate to increase 
accountability by requiring more physician and nurse practitioner engagement 
in the certification and recertification process. 
 Moreover, OIG has produced evidence that noncompliance with Medicare 
requirements and an increase in the number of days of hospice care seem to 
go hand in hand, at least with respect to hospice care provided in nursing 
facilities.  In 2007, OIG determined that, on average, Medicare beneficiaries’ 
hospice care in nursing facilities cost the government twenty-five percent more 
                                                                                                                           
146. See supra text accompanying notes 122-25. 
147. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., MEDICARE 
HOSPICE CARE FOR BENEFICIARIES IN NURSING FACILITIES:  COMPLIANCE WITH MEDICARE 
COVERAGE REQUIREMENTS (2009), available at oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-02-06-00221.pdf 
[hereinafter  MEDICARE HOSPICE CARE FOR BENEFICIARIES IN NURSING FACILITIES]. 
148. Id. at 10.  
149. MedPAC Meeting, supra note 138, at 185 (statement of Kim Neuman). 
150. Id. at 186. 
151. The same participant also noted, however, that the panelists “didn’t think much 
of this [improper certification] was going on, if any.” Id. at 200 (statement of Dr. Mark Miller). 
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than Medicare beneficiaries’ hospice care in other settings.152  For the vast 
majority of patient diagnosis categories, Medicare “beneficiaries in nursing 
facilities had longer average lengths of stay in hospice care than beneficiaries in 
other settings.”153  Most strikingly, sixteen percent of beneficiaries in nursing 
facilities received hospice care for more than 180 days, as compared with only 
eleven percent in other settings.154  On average, beneficiaries in nursing 
facilities received hospice care for eighty days, as compared with sixty-two 
days for beneficiaries in other settings.155  Coupled with OIG’s finding that 
eighty-two percent of claims for Medicare coverage of hospice care in nursing 
facilities failed to comply with Medicare requirements,156 it is not a huge leap 
of logic to infer that longer periods of hospice care may be linked to 
noncompliance with requirements. 
 Whether such inadequate documentation stems from negligence or fraud is 
unclear, and it seems likely that both are present in the system.  It is possible, 
for example, that mere negligence, perhaps due to lack of adequate staffing, 
underlies some failures to involve all the members of the requisite 
interdisciplinary team when establishing patients’ plans of care.157  Similarly, it 
is possible that incomplete plans of care are due to inadvertent errors.158  More 
troubling, however, is OIG’s finding that in nine percent of claims the election 
statements patients signed to receive hospice care affirmatively misrepresented 
the terms of that election.159 
 In some nursing facilities, OIG even has discovered claims for payment for 
respite care that were clearly improper.160  Medicare may not reimburse 
hospices for more than five consecutive days of respite care,161 and the vast 
                                                                                                                           
152. MEDICARE HOSPICE CARE, supra note 118, at 14 (explaining that in 2005, the 
average amount spent on hospice care per beneficiary in a nursing facility was $10,631, while the 
average amount spent on hospice care per beneficiary in other settings was $8,500). 
153. Id. at 13 (finding this to be true for fourteen of fifteen diagnosis categories). 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. While not using the same data set as this one, OIG’s finding to that effect was 
part of the same series of investigations into nursing facility practices.  See MEDICARE HOSPICE 
CARE FOR BENEFICIARIES IN NURSING FACILITIES, supra note 147, at 2, 10.   
157. Id. at 13 (“For 34 percent of claims, the plans of care were not established by all 
of the required members of the interdisciplinary groups.”). 
An interdisciplinary group, along with the attending physician and the medical 
director or physician designee, must participate in establishing each patient’s hospice plan of 
care.  42 C.F.R. § 418.58(a) (2008). OIG found that pastoral or other counselors had not 
participated in establishing patients’ plans of care in thirty-one percent of claims.  MEDICARE 
HOSPICE CARE FOR BENEFICIARIES IN NURSING FACILITIES, supra note 147, at 13. Social workers 
did not participate in twenty-two percent of claims.  Id.  Registered nurses did not participate in 
five percent of claims, and doctors did not participate in two percent of claims.  Id. 
158. See id. at 14 (“For 31 percent of claims, the plans of care were missing a 
necessary component.”). 
159. Id. at 11-12. 
160. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (defining respite care). 
161. 42 C.F.R. § 418.204(b)(2) (2010). 
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majority of beneficiaries receiving it had it for a total of five days or less in 
2005.162  Yet a small number of beneficiaries (fifty-four) received more than 
five consecutive days during that year, including one beneficiary whose 122 
consecutive days of respite care cost the government $16,726.163  Another 
small number of beneficiaries (sixty-two) reportedly received respite care, 
which is supposed to be inpatient care designed to give family caregivers a 
break from caring for their loved ones at home, although those beneficiaries 
resided in nursing facilities.164  If patients are in nursing facilities, however, by 
definition, they are not living at home with caregivers who need to send those 
patients for a short period of inpatient care to get a break.  These claims are 
suspicious, to say the least, and OIG has referred these providers to CMS for 
further investigation. 
 In sum, Congress undeniably has a valid purpose for attempting to ensure 
that certifications and recertifications are valid.  OIG investigations, testimony 
at MedPAC hearings, and statistics in MedPAC reports indicate that both the 
agencies closely scrutinizing the industry, and even some industry 
representatives themselves, are concerned about the potential for fraud and 
abuse in the present system.  Especially when costs are a concern, it seems fair 
to impose some extra burden on those appropriately providing hospice care, 
as long as the burden is minimal,165 to prevent wasting money by reimbursing 
the costs of care inappropriately provided.  The result should free up more 
money for those appropriately providing care. 
B.  Possible Negative Effects of the Legislation 
 As the Act is implemented, legal, regulatory, and medical professionals must 
be on guard to ensure that efforts to rein in fraud and abuse do not 
inappropriately chill recertification of patients as being eligible for hospice 
care.  Inadequate documentation and increasing overall lengths of stay may be 
due to any number of reasons other than fraud and abuse, and some hospices, 
particularly rural ones, may suffer from the face-to-face encounter 
requirement. 
 Not even CMS has found an improper motive in all the noncompliance 
with Medicare requirements OIG has identified.  Based upon the OIG 
investigations of the 1990s and 2000s, MedPAC made three recommendations 
to CMS in March 2010.  First, MedPAC recommended that CMS should 
                                                                                                                           
162. See LEVINSON, supra note 43, at 4.  
163. Id. at 5. OIG referred these cases to CMS for investigation.  Id. at 6 (noting that 
“[w]e will provide additional information about these potentially inappropriate cases to CMS in 
a separate memorandum”). 
164. See 42 C.F.R. § 418.204(b)(1) (defining “respite care” as “short-term inpatient 
care provided to the individual only when necessary to relieve the family members or other 
persons caring for the individual”) (emphasis added).  See also LEVINSON, supra note 43, at 5-6. 
165. CMS, for example, considered whether the narrative requirement it added was 
“overly burdensome” and concluded that it was not. Medicare Program; Hospice Wage Index 
for Fiscal Year 2010, 74 Fed. Reg. 39384, 39399 (Aug. 6, 2009) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 
418). 
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“educate hospices about coverage requirements and their importance in 
ensuring quality of care.”166  Second, MedPAC suggested that CMS “provide 
hospices with tools and guidance to help them properly demonstrate that 
coverage requirements are met.”167  Finally, MedPAC suggested that CMS 
“strengthen monitoring practices for hospice claims.”168  In response, CMS 
focused on education and the provision of tools and guidance, saying with 
regard to monitoring practices only that it would “instruct Medicare 
contractors to consider the coverage requirements issues . . . when prioritizing 
. . . medical review strategies or other interventions.”169  Although MedPAC 
continued to press for increased monitoring,170 CMS seemed to consider most 
of the problems to constitute negligence or to reflect lack of awareness and 
education rather than to signal fraud. 
 The reality is that there are many valid reasons for increased lengths of stay 
unrelated to either negligence or fraud.  For example, length of stay might 
increase because of a change in the type of patients electing to receive hospice 
care.  At one time, most patients receiving hospice care had terminal cancer 
diagnoses.171  Over time, however, more and more patients with a wide variety 
of terminal illnesses have elected to receive hospice care.172  By the year 2008, 
for example, patients with a wide variety of terminal illnesses were accessing 
hospice care, whereas the majority of hospice patients a decade previously had 
been cancer patients.173  An accompanying increase in average amount of time 
in hospice care, from fifty-four days in the year 2000 to eighty-three days in 
the year 2008,174 is at least partially attributable to this change in patient mix.175  
Patients with non-cancer diagnoses experience more acute episodes, causing 
peaks and valleys in the required levels of care, and thus die less predictably 
than those with cancer diagnoses, who experience general declines in 
condition requiring relatively predictable courses of care.176  Not all studies 
compare patients of like diagnoses, as the OIG study did when studying 
                                                                                                                           
166. COMPENDIUM OF UNIMPLEMENTED RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 119, at 23. 
167. Id.  
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. Iglehart, supra note 122, at 2701. 
172. Id.  
173. In 2008, sixty-nine percent of hospice patients had terminal illnesses other than 
cancer, while only forty-seven percent of hospice patients had non-cancer diagnoses in 1998.  
See MedPAC 2010, supra note 11, at 145.   
174. Id. at 149. 
175. Id. at 151. 
176. See, e.g., Brumley, supra note 49, at 716 (noting that “the patterns of morbidity 
and mortality have shifted toward chronic illness that is marked by episodic needs for higher 
levels of care and unpredictable disease trajectories”).  See also MedPAC 2010, supra note 11, at 
151 (noting that “it may be harder to predict life expectancy” for patients with non-cancer 
diagnoses). 
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hospice care in nursing facilities.177  To the extent that some fail to do so, the 
studies may be misleading. 
 Additionally, the increase in for-profit hospices, while perhaps presenting 
public relations challenges,178 does not necessarily bring with it an increase in 
fraudulent activity in hospice care.  Even if failure to comply with Medicare 
requirements in patient documentation causes longer lengths of stay, for-profit 
hospices apparently do a better job of complying with Medicare requirements 
than not-for-profit hospices do.179  Nearly ninety percent of the claims for 
payment for hospice care submitted by not-for-profit hospices failed to meet 
Medicare requirements in the OIG study; for-profit hospices failed to comply 
in a significantly smaller seventy-four percent of their submitted claims.180 
 Finally, there exists some risk of ‘throwing the baby out with the 
bathwater’181 with the recertification requirement. Concerns about 
administrative burdens surfaced in the 2008 MedPAC hearings182 and in 
comments on the proposed regulations in 2009.183  In particular, when CMS 
considered whether to require recertification visits but declined to do so, it 
described concerns about the lack of physician and nurse-practitioner 
resources in small and rural hospices.184  At the time CMS began to require 
                                                                                                                           
177. See supra text accompanying notes 152-56. 
178. Hospice provider VITAS Healthcare Corp., for example, is a for-profit, wholly 
owned subsidiary of Chemed Corp. and has been used as an example of the contrast between 
the traditional “image of charitable organizations bringing comfort to the dying” and “big 
business.”  See Chemed Corp.’s Vitas Unit Aims to Acquire, CINCINNATI BUSINESS COURIER (July 
12, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/cincinnati/stories/2010/07/12/story2.html.  
Chemed’s other wholly owned subsidiary is Roto-Rooter, Inc., a plumbing and drain-cleaning 
provider.  See Corporate Profile, CHEMED CORP., http://ir.chemed.com/phoenix.zhtml?c= 
72704&p=irol-homeProfile&t=&id=& (last visited Mar. 4, 2011). The intermingling between 
the two industries prompted much laughter at a conference this author attended in June, 2010, 
thus also justifying the conclusion in the text that VITAS’s status might present some public 
relations challenges.  This is true even though VITAS attempts through its press releases to 
emphasize its not-for-profit roots. See Vitas Innovative Hospice Care® Signs National Agreement with 
American CareSource, BUSINESSWIRE (Jan. 28, 2010), 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20100128006517/en/VITAS-Innovative-Hospice-
Care%C2%AE-Signs-National-Agreement (explaining that VITAS “has evolved from its 
founding as a volunteer organization by a United Methodist minister and a registered nurse”). 
 179. MEDICARE HOSPICE CARE FOR BENEFICIARIES IN NURSING FACILITIES, supra note 
147, at 10. 
180. Id.  
181. The phrase means eliminating the good with the bad.  See Wolfgang Mieder, 
“(Don’t) Throw the Baby Out with the Bathwater”: The Americanization of a German Proverb and Proverbial 
Expression, DEPROVERBIO, http://www.deproverbio.com/DPjournal/DP,1,1,95/BABY.html 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2011). 
182. MedPAC Meeting, supra note 138, at 220-23.  
183. See Medicare Program; Hospice Wage Scale for Fiscal Year 2010, 74 Fed. Reg. 
39384, 39398 (Aug. 6, 2009) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 405) (regarding initial certification 
narrative); id. at 39402-03 (regarding recertification visits). 
184. Id. at 39403.  Some of those commenting suggested that (a) resources would be 
better-devoted to take steps to improve quality, rather than to simply monitor recertifications 
more closely, and (b) required recertification visits might only be appropriate for hospices with 
excessively long lengths of stay, rather than across the board for all Medicare-certified hospices.  
Id. 
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narratives, it recognized the potential for additional paperwork to become 
burdensome, and sought to minimize the burden to the extent it could do so 
and still achieve its goal of increasing accountability with regard to initial 
certifications.185  Congress has not similarly narrowly tailored its requirement 
that face-to-face encounters precede all hospice recertifications. 
 Rural hospices in particular may be unable to ensure face-to-face 
encounters for all hospice recertifications.  Generally speaking, Medicare per 
diem payments already are lower for rural than for urban hospices,186 leading 
some researchers to conclude that “many hospices, especially small rural 
hospices, are likely to have costs that are not adequately covered by the current 
Medicare payment system.”187  Not only are the per diems lower, but, in 
addition, because of low volume, small rural hospices are more likely to have 
financial difficulty than other hospices because they have fewer patients over 
which to spread their fixed costs.188 
 Staffing challenges abound for rural hospices with low patient volumes 
because they may not be able to fund full-time positions, and if rural hospices 
cover large geographic areas they may have difficulty finding staff willing to 
travel to remote areas.189  Casey et al. suggest that hospice workers in 
“resource-poor rural areas” might be especially susceptible to “burnout and 
compassion fatigue.”190  All four hospices those researchers studied “identified 
the distances traveled to patients’ homes as a major challenge to serving rural 
areas.”191  The hospice workers they studied traveled up to sixty miles one way 
to serve patients and occasionally went farther to ensure access to hospice care 
for patients who otherwise would have none.192  Traveling such distances costs 
both time and money, affecting not only the hospice worker(s) in question, but 
also patients whom workers could not visit while traveling to and from their 
distant patient(s).193  The hospices studied also expressed concern about staff 
safety when traveling in isolated areas and noted that winter weather in some 
locations made travel more difficult.194 
 These challenges for rural hospices counsel caution when imposing 
additional regulatory burdens on them, no matter how valid the concerns 
underlying that regulation.  The field of palliative care already has experienced 
its share of negative, unintended consequences from efforts to eliminate 
                                                                                                                           
185. Id. at 39399-400.  
186. Michelle M. Casey et al., Providing Hospice Care in Rural Areas: Challenges and 
Strategies, 22 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE MED. 363, 363 (2005). 
187. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
188. Id. at 364. 
189. Id. at 363. 
190. Id. The researchers indicated that this was especially likely “when the boundaries 
between [the hospice workers’] work and personal lives are blurred.” Id.  
191. Id. at 366. 
192. Casey et al., supra note 186 at 366. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
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undesirable activities, as illustrated by the struggle to balance investigation and 
prosecution of drug diversion with encouragement of appropriate pain 
relief.195  Historically, physicians have under-treated pain, prompting efforts in 
the 1990s to encourage them to appropriately identify, calibrate, and treat it.196  
In the course of trying to improve patients’ access to appropriate pain relief, 
however, those studying the problem of under-treatment of pain realized that 
the law contributed to the problem.  Physicians under-treated pain, at least in 
part, because they feared prosecutorial and regulatory efforts to counter 
diversion of prescription pain medications to those abusing drugs.197  It has 
taken several years for the message that physicians should do a better job of 
treating pain to overwhelm the negative chilling effect of much-publicized 
governmental efforts to eliminate drug diversion, and many physicians have 
not yet sufficiently overcome their fears to prescribe appropriate levels of pain 
medications to all patients.198 
 With lessons from the history of pain management in mind, legal, 
regulatory, and medical professionals should be on guard to ensure that the 
recertification requirement does not chill appropriate access to continued 
hospice services.  Just as drug diversion and abuse investigation and 
prosecution for years inappropriately have chilled appropriate pain 
management, there exists a risk that regulatory activity relating to hospice care 
                                                                                                                           
195. See CTR. FOR PRACTICAL BIOETHICS ET AL., BALANCE, UNIFORMITY AND 
FAIRNESS: EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT FOR INVESTIGATING AND 
PROSECUTING THE DIVERSION OF PRESCRIPTION PAIN MEDICATIONS WHILE PROTECTING 
APPROPRIATE MEDICAL PRACTICE 3 (Feb. 2009), available at www.fsmb.org/pdf/pub 
_bbpi_policy_brief.pdf.  
196. See generally Ben A. Rich, The Politics of Pain: Rhetoric or Reform?, 8 DEPAUL J. 
HEALTH CARE L. 519 (2005) (recounting the history and identifying policy initiatives intended to 
encourage appropriate pain relief). 
197. See, e.g., Diane E. Hoffmann & Anita J. Tarzian, Achieving the Right Balance in 
Oversight of Physician Opioid Prescribing for Pain: The Role of State Medical Boards, 31 J. L. MED. & 
ETHICS 21, 25-30 (2003) (describing physicians’ responses to study questions about disciplinary 
investigations and proceedings for over-prescribing opioids); Stephen J. Ziegler & Nicholas P. 
Lovrich, Jr., Pain Relief, Prescription Drugs, and Prosecution: A Four-State Survey of Chief Prosecutors, 31 
J. L. MED. & ETHICS 75, 75-76 (2003) (describing physician responses to study questions  about 
their reasons for under-dispensing opioids as part of a study of criminal prosecutions).  For 
recent anecdotal evidence, see John Leland, A Battle Against Prescription Drugs Causes Pain, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 3, 2010, at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/03/us/ 
03rules.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=john%20leland%20pain&st=cse. 
Concerns about such investigations and prosecutions are only partly to blame for 
under-treatment of pain.  Many cultural factors impact pain management as well.  See generally 
Ben A. Rich, A Prescription for the Pain: The Emerging Standard of Care for Pain Management, 26 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1 (2000) (identifying and discussing various barriers to appropriate pain 
management, some cultural and some related to regulatory concerns). 
198. See Diane E. Hoffmann, Treating Pain v. Reducing Drug Diversion and Abuse: 
Recalibrating the Balance in Our Drug Control Laws and Policies, 1 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 
231, 236 (2008) (tracing the evolution of the problem and suggesting a new standard by which 
to judge pain control efforts to appropriately balance “the dual goals of pain treatment and 
reduction of drug diversion and abuse”).   See also Leland, supra note 197. 
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also could chill its provision.199 CMS recognized, as it amended the 
requirements for initial certifications, that “at recertification, not all patients 
may show measurable decline.”200  Its statement to that effect suggests that it 
would agree that it should “not regulate the process such that hospices will be 
encouraged to discharge patients inappropriately.”201 Given the travel 
challenges and staffing concerns rural hospices face, requiring face-to-face 
encounters may be quite difficult for that sub-set of hospice providers in 
particular.202 
C.  Better Ways to Address Congressional Suspicion 
 Additionally, the recertification requirement does not seem to strike at the 
heart of the problem.  Only four percent of the year 2006 claims OIG studied 
failed to meet certification requirements,203 with the bulk of coverage 
requirement deficiencies stemming from missing plan of care requirements,204 
improper election advice and documentation,205 and failures to follow plans of 
care.206  CMS already has increased accountability since that study by, in 2009, 
requiring narratives supporting initial certifications of patients as being 
terminally ill within the meaning of the Medicare regulations.207  Especially in 
                                                                                                                           
199. Some, for example, have argued that Operation Restore Trust, the OIG initiative 
to examine hospice referrals to combat fraud and abuse in the 1990s, had a negative, chilling 
effect on hospice enrollment.  See Gerald M. Morris, Hospice Fraud and Abuse: Operation Restore 
Trust and Beyond, 20 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE 1, 5 (2003). 
200. Medicare Program; Hospice Wage Scale for Fiscal Year 2010, 74 Fed. Reg. 
39384, 39399 (Aug. 6, 2009) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405 & 418).   
201. Id. 
202. It may be that rural hospice providers could convince CMS that use of 
technology such as Skype to confer with patients is a “face-to-face encounter,” but 
consideration of whether such technology-mediated communication would or should in fact 
satisfy the face-to-face encounter requirement is well beyond the scope of this Article.  Cf. 
Catherine Saint Louis, Should Surgeons Meet Patients Online?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, at E3, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/fashion/21Skin.html?_r=1 (discussing virtual 
consultations in the plastic surgery field and noting that all the plastic surgeons interviewed 
noted that they also met in person with the patients in question). 
203. MEDICARE HOSPICE CARE FOR BENEFICIARIES IN NURSING FACILITIES, supra 
note 147, at 16. 
204. Id. at 12.  For Medicare to fund hospice care, the hospice provider must establish 
a plan of care through an interdisciplinary team.  Sixty-three percent of claims failed on one or 
more of the regulatory plan of care requirements.  Id. at 13.  
205. Id. at 10.  Thirty-three percent of claims failed to meet election requirements.  
Most seriously, some election statements were misleading, suggesting that beneficiaries might 
revoke hospice care by exercising their rights to autonomy in treatment decisions rather than 
explaining that beneficiaries must affirmatively revoke elections in writing.  Id. at 11-12. 
206. Id. at 15. Thirty-one percent of claims provided fewer services than the patients’ 
plans of care had specified.  Id. 
207. Medicare Program; Hospice Wage Scale for Fiscal Year 2010, 74 Fed. Reg. 
39384, 39398-39400 (Aug. 6, 2009) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 40, 418). See supra text 
accompanying notes 123-25. 
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the aftermath of CMS doing so, it seems that Congress or HHS could more 
likely limit fraud and abuse by addressing other documentation deficiencies, 
rather than strengthening recertification requirements.208  
 In fact, regulators previously have proposed reforms which are more likely 
to help than the face-to-face encounter recertification requirement.  As long 
ago as 2008, MedPAC proposed a payment system pursuant to which, rather 
than reimbursing hospices a consistent per diem amount, Medicare would vary 
them.209  Specifically, MedPAC proposed that Medicare pay higher per diem 
amounts at the beginning and end of patient stays, when patients consume the 
most resources, but reduce rates for the period in between, when hospices 
expend fewer resources on patient care.210  In 2009, MedPAC again reminded 
HHS that it had recommended such a payment system, to “better reflect 
hospices’ level of effort in providing care throughout the course of a hospice 
episode and promote stays of a length consistent with hospice as an end-of-life 
benefit.”211  Such a change in payment methodology, MedPAC urged, would 
assure that Medicare would not merely become a “de facto long-term care 
benefit” by affecting length of stay.212  Specifically, “the new payment system 
would affect the length of stay by ensuring decisions regarding admissions to 
the benefit would be made at the appropriate time in the patient’s disease 
progression.”213  In March 2010, MedPAC again reminded policymakers of 
that recommendation.214  The National Hospice and Palliative Care 
Organization has supported such a recommendation,215 as have scholars of 
medical and health care economics.216 
 Rather than operating at the margins, seizing on the quick fix of requiring 
more paperwork at certain points along the way, this revision to the payment 
system could more precisely provide incentives for appropriate certification 
and recertification.  It is too late now for Congress to adopt this 
recommendation rather than making recertification requirements more 
                                                                                                                           
208. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
124 Stat. 119 (2010).  
 209. MedPAC Meeting, supra note 138, at 177-82 (explaining that while Medicare 
payment rates are consistent throughout long stays, hospices incur most of the costs at the 
beginning and end of patient stays). 
210. Id. at 177.  
211. Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment Policy, Before the H. Subcommittee on Health, 
Comm. on Ways and Means, 111th Cong. at 23 (2009), available at http://www.medpac.gov 
/documents/Mar09_March%20report%20testimony_WM%20FINAL.pdf (statement of Glenn 
M. Hackbarth, Chairman, Medicare Payment Advisory Comm’n) [hereinafter Statement of 
Glenn M. Hackbarth]. 
 212. Id.  
213. Id. 
214. MEDPAC 2010, supra note 11, at 146. 
215. Press Release, Nat’l Hospice and Palliative Care Org., National End-of-Life 
Organizations Release Consensus Statement on Hospice, the Medicare Hospice Benefit, and 
Key Issues for the Future (Jan. 8, 2009), available at http://www.nhpco.org/i4a/pages/ 
index.cfm?pageid=5803 [hereinafter NHPCO Press Release] (expressing support for MedPAC 
recommendation number one). 
216. See, e.g., Iglehart, supra note 122, at 2703; Lindrooth & Weisbrod, supra note 141, 
at 355; Huskamp et al., supra note 85, at 210. 
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stringent.  Instead, Congress has the option to repeal the new recertification 
requirement and revise Medicare’s overall hospice payment structure.  
Alternatively, it should carefully monitor the effect of the new recertification 
requirement; should the requirement begin to inappropriately reduce the 
amount of hospice care patients receive, Congress should amend it to apply 
only to larger, or larger urban, hospices.  Congress can also decide to repeal 
the recertification requirement and adopt MedPAC’s proposed alternative 
method of achieving its goals.  Congress has expressed support for hospice 
care by indicating that it is open to clearing patients’ paths to earlier access 
through coverage of concurrent care.  One can only hope that its desire to 
guard against fraud and abuse does not end up depriving some deserving 
patients of hospice care. 
 In summary, requiring face-to-face encounters not only could affect 
continued access to hospice care for some patients, but it also might not 
actually strike at the root of the problem.  National hospice organizations have 
supported increased monitoring in the form of additional documentation 
because it is difficult to argue that additional oversight is unnecessary.217  
Appropriately, however, they have warned that “[s]pecial consideration should 
be given to the unique issues facing rural and small hospice providers in 
assessing the impact and implementation of such measures.”218  Other 
methods for addressing the problem at hand exist, and at least one other 
proposed method (variable per diem rates) would better reflect such 
consideration for rural and small hospices.219 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 The historic changes the Act made to America’s healthcare system overall 
include some revisions to the rules governing payment for hospice care.  
Congress immediately expanded the number and categories of services for 
which Medicaid will pay in the case of terminally ill children, and it has set the 
stage for studies that could provide the evidence supporting Medicare’s doing 
so for terminally ill adults.  Congress also, however, revealed a certain level of 
suspicion about hospices, enacting into law a recertification requirement that 
CMS had declined to impose through regulations.220 
 With respect to that recertification requirement, patients are left to rely on 
the wisdom and strength of healthcare providers to ‘do the right thing’ and 
practice good medicine rather than becoming overcautious and refusing to 
recertify patients for hospice care when cases are not clear-cut.  Where 
                                                                                                                           
217. NHPCO Press Release, supra note 215. 
218. Id.  
 219. See MedPAC Meeting, supra note 138, at 177 (statement of Dr. James E. 
Mathews). 
 220. See Medicare Program; Hospice Wage Index for Fiscal Year 2010, 74 Fed. Reg. 
39384, 39398-99 (Aug. 6, 2009) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405 & 418).   
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hospices already provide for in-person visits for all recertifications,221 this 
additional official requirement will make no difference in practice.  Where, 
however, scarce resources have mandated that personnel concentrate on other 
efforts, this change may affect practice a great deal. 
 As MedPAC has noted, “[t]he creation of the Medicare hospice benefit was 
more than just a change to the Medicare benefits package; it was a statement 
recognizing and respecting social values and patient preferences at the end of 
life.”222  In this era of health care reform, regulators should take care not to 
lessen or eliminate the value of that statement and the effect hospice care can 
have on patients and their families near the end of life.  Given the 
unpredictability of date of death and the potential effect on rural or small 
hospice providers, the face-to-face recertification visit requirement deserves 
careful watch over the next few years following its implementation.  If data 
indicates that deserving patients are not continuing to receive hospice services 
because of hospice physicians’ and nurse practitioners’ inabilities to visit them 
personally to recertify terminal illness, Congress should repeal or amend this 
requirement, perhaps adopting MedPAC’s suggestion that hospice payments 
vary over the span of patient care. 
 
  
                                                                                                                           
221. At one meeting, a hospice physician assured this author that her hospice already 
did so, long before the Act was passed. 
222.  Statement of Glenn M. Hackbarth, supra note 211, at 22. 

